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*  You inherit a relatively healthy European economy, 
but you face three formidable challenges in the next 
ﬁ ve years. First, you must deﬁ ne Europe’s place in an 
increasingly bipolar world driven by a geostrategic 
rivalry between the United States and China.   
You should avoid protectionism and instead strengthen 
Europe’s technological, ﬁ nancial and security 
capacities. You shoul d continue to support multilateral 
institutions and stand ready to retaliate against trade 
aggression. Second, global warming is a reality and 
temperatures appear to be rising faster than forecast. 
You need to impose higher prices on greenhouse-
gas emissions, guide a deep transformation of our 
economies, minimise the resulting social fallout, 
ensure border carbon adjustment and globalise the 
EU’s decarbonisation. Third, you need to manage 
the economy and EU cohesion. The main worry is a 
deep recession or even a new crisis. Guide European 
policymakers on the use of pro-active ﬁ scal policy, 
reform the governance of the euro area and address tax 
fraud and evasion.
*   GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES 
*   LOW-CARBON TRANSFORMATION 
*   CRISIS RISK 
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1. STATE OF AFFAIRS
Congratulations on your appointments! First, the good news: 
you face a much more benign macroeconomic situation than 
when your predecessors assumed offi  ce fi ve years ago. Th en, the 
European Union was just emerging from the worst economic and 
fi nancial crisis in its history. Economic growth was still very weak, 
unemployment was close to 12 percent in the euro area (and just 
above 10 percent in the EU), and the public debt-to-GDP ratio was 
above 90 percent. Now, after fi ve years of economic growth at an 
average of roughly 2 percent, unemployment is down to about 8 
percent in the euro area (and less than 7 percent in the EU), and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is approaching 80 percent. 
However, the global landscape has shifted dramatically in the 
last few years. A G2-like world, characterised by a broad geopo-
litical confrontation between the United States and China, has 
become a reality. Five years ago, the extent to which Sino-US 
relations have deteriorated was not yet obvious, and it was not 
clear that the EU would have to defi ne clearly its own way forward. 
China’s fast rise is a tremendous achievement. It has lifted mil-
lions out of poverty and China is increasingly becoming an engine 
of global innovation. But the Chinese economic and political 
model also poses a challenge to Europe and the West in general. 
In some quarters, China’s illiberal political model is even viewed 
as an alternative to our sometimes slow-acting liberal democra-
cies. China is an important market and economic partner but also 
poses an economic challenge. Meanwhile, the US has become 
a less reliable partner than it was fi ve years ago and some even 
doubt how strongly it will defend liberal democracy.
Th e last fi ve years have also seen continued increases in 
global greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 1), despite the 2015 
Paris Agreement. Th e frequency of extreme weather events has 
increased and the world has become warmer (IPCC, 2018). 
Increasingly, scientists point to positive feedback-loops where the 
increased temperature leads to further increases in global temper-
ature1. In that light, the Paris goals might even be insuffi  cient2. So 
far, the EU has not managed to reduce its greenhouse gas emis-
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widely accepted. It has not strengthened its policy framework nec-
essary for a profound and deep transformation of our economy, 
which is simply not happening fast enough. Biodiversity was not a 
priority for your predecessors and has been allowed to deteriorate 
in Europe3.
Th ough EU employment has increased substantially and 
income inequality remains less pronounced than anywhere else 
in the world, inequality and exclusion remain important concerns. 
Youth unemployment is still worryingly high in some EU coun-
tries, resulting in the social disenchantment of an entire genera-
tion. More broadly, one worrying tendency in many EU countries 
has been cuts to the top tax rates levied on companies, wealth, 
inheritance and high incomes4. Low progressivity and a high tax 
burden on the working middle class to fund Europe’s social market 
economy nurture a sense of injustice in society. A key challenge is 
to reconcile equity and effi  ciency5.
Institutionally, perhaps the most signifi cant change of the 
last fi ve years has been the transformation of the Commission, 
Figure 1: Annual CO2 emissions by world region
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center. Note: Annual CO2 emissions measured in billion tonnes per year. 
Emissions data have been converted from units of carbon to CO2 using a conversion factor of 3.67. Regions denoted 
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traditionally viewed as the guardian of the treaties, into an explic-
itly political Commission, led by a strong president who claimed 
an electoral mandate to lead. Th is controversial change of orien-
tation has allowed the Commission president to a greater extent 
than before to exercise leadership and impose priorities on the 
entire Commission. Th e centralisation of communication and 
political decision making has been seen by Commission staff  as a 
major change compared to the previous Commission, allowing the 
Commission to set the EU’s agenda (Kassim and Connolly, 2018). 
Th is institutional change is an important modifi cation of the way 
the EU works. 
Th e EU and national institutions are confronted with a lack of 
trust. Th e situation for the EU has improved in the last fi ve years, 
with trust increasing and support for the EU higher among the 
young than the population overall, but the number of citizens 
distrusting the EU still exceeds those who trust the EU. Th is is par-
ticularly visible in some southern European countries6. Certainly 
one of the main reasons for this is the lack of convergence and the 
severe recessions that parts of the south of Europe experienced. 
Such lack of convergence and trust risks undermining the sustain-
ability of the euro area and the EU. Furthermore, traditional politi-
cal parties are losing ground, resulting in a more pluralist political 
system. Elections also confi rm certain established cleavages of 
voter preferences across countries, which might make compro-
mises more diffi  cult in future.
Th e signifi cantly higher turnout in the 2019 European elections 
is a sign of a renewed demand from citizens that Europe should 
deliver on the big topics of our times. Citizens want the EU to 
prioritise maintaining peace, creating jobs and tackling climate 
change7. More than three quarters of citizens consider the fi ght 
against terrorism, tackling unemployment and protection of the 
environment as the three key priorities for the EU, but the fi rst two 
priorities have declined in importance (Eurobarometer, 2018). 
Moreover, citizens are broadly divided on whether the EU should 
wait until all countries are ready before proceeding with new ini-
tiatives, or whether some countries should move ahead. Citizens, 
however, are convinced that when it comes to the big international 
*TRUST IN 
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questions, such as dealing with China, Russia and the United 
States under President Trump, the EU should speak with one 
voice.
2. CHALLENGES
Th ree main challenges await you, coinciding with the areas that 
citizens increasingly believe the EU should deliver on: (1) the EU’s 
capacity to establish itself as a stronger and more independent 
global player; (2) a climate and environmental strategy that deliv-
ers; (3) the EU’s capacity to increase cohesion, boost employment 
and react to a deterioration in the economic situation.
Europe’s place in the world
Th e fi rst, and perhaps defi ning, challenge of your presidencies 
will be to ensure that Europe still has a place in a world which is 
rapidly shaping into a bipolar system dominated by China and 
the United States. Citizens clearly want the EU to act on issues 
of global importance and understand that the member states in 
which they live, even the biggest, cannot act alone. Reinforcing 
the EU’s capacity to be a global force is therefore an opportunity to 
demonstrate the EU’s signifi cant added value. 
By some key economic measures, in particular GDP and trade, 
the EU is on par with China and the United States, and far bigger 
than any other player. Its single voice on trade and standards 
commands respect in global bodies such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and bilaterally with partners, including 
China and the US. 
If the trade confl icts initiated by President Trump had been 
If the trade conflicts initiated by 
President Trump had been only about 
trade, the EU would have been well 
placed to defend its interests
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confl icts about trade only, the EU would have been relatively well 
placed to defend its commercial interests. But the reality is that 
these trade battles are part of a geopolitical rivalry between China 
and the United States, and when it comes to geopolitics, the EU 
is ill-equipped. Th e EU’s weakness stems in part from its lack of 
a defence capability. Without the US participating in Europe’s 
defence, European countries would be vulnerable to foreign 
aggression.
Europe’s weakness in this area is also the result of its lack of 
strength in some key technologies, including digital hardware and 
software systems that are vital for security. A number of global-
ly-important networks (such as fi nancial or data networks) have 
developed in an asymmetric way, giving the states with physical 
and legal jurisdiction over them the ability to extract information 
and leverage power. Th ese networks tend to have central nodes of 
infl uence in the US and increasingly in China – while the EU still 
has an institutional weakness in terms of exercising power over 
those networks it can infl uence (Farrell and Newman, 2019).
Th e EU has much to lose from the emergence of a bipolar 
world, and from the rivalry between China and the United States. 
Th e threat is to both the EU’s economic interests and its political 
values. Th e EU is closely intertwined with the United States and 
China, which are its two main trade and investment partners. A 
Sino-US trade war is sure, therefore, to have signifi cant negative 
consequences for the EU economy.
But the bigger consequences are political. Th e two rival powers 
will aim to lure the EU into their camps because of the EU’s eco-
nomic assets, and in particular its large market. Th e EU obviously 
wants to preserve its values of democracy and the rule of law, 
Europe’s geopolitical weakness is partly 
the result of its lack of strength in some 
key technologies; leverage over networks 
matters
*USCHINA RIVALRY
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social justice and multilateralism, and given its history and values, 
is clearly politically much closer to the US than to China. However, 
the rejection of multilateralism by the Trump administration 
has made the EU uncomfortable with the US position, and has 
opened the door to closer political relations with China, which has 
assumed the mantle of multilateralism.
It would be a nightmare scenario for the EU if it had to choose 
between liberal democracy and the United States on one hand, 
and multilateralism and China on the other. In both cases, the EU 
might have to compromise on social justice, which is practiced 
neither by China nor by the United States. 
To avoid compromising on our political values, you need to 
succeed in escaping the bipolar scenario. You should be under 
no illusion. Unfortunately, the bipolar scenario is by far the most 
likely, but it is also the most dangerous for Europe, and probably 
for other parts of the world which share our values. Y ou should 
aim not only to strengthen Europe but also to support all multilat-
eral frameworks that can help off set a bipolar scenario
Important further elements of Europe’s strategy in defi ning its 
place in the world are the relationship with our neighbouring con-
tinent, Africa, and the EU’s strategy on migration. Both topics are 
clearly important priorities for EU citizens.
Climate and the environment   
When it comes to climate change and the environment, your chal-
lenge will be to overcome vested interests, and manage the social 
and economic fallout of a truly transformative agenda. Citizens 
want you to address this pressing challenge. At the same time, they 
aren’t likely to accept the consequences of strong climate action 
easily. Th e yellow-vests movement in France serves as a powerful 
reminder that addressing the social consequences of climate poli-
cies needs to be an integral part of a successful climate strategy.
Vested interests will want to prevent you from addressing cli-
mate change. But you should be clear: climate change is a dra-
matic reality for humanity. Industrial economies have been lead-
ing contributors in the past and have a moral obligation to address 
their emissions head-on. Moreover, by doing so, they produce a 
*LOWCARBON 
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template that others can follow and that in itself can also be a busi-
ness opportunity. Failing to address the challenge head-on would 
be inacceptable to citizens, and could also mean that the EU loses 
out on key technological developments – such as electro-mobility 
– that will shape the future. Meanwhile, a powerful lobby will try 
to prevent you fundamentally changing the EU’s common agricul-
tural policy – which you must do if you want to restore lost biodi-
versity in Europe (Pe’er et al, 2014) and free fi nancial resources for 
more forward-looking expenses.
Growth and convergence
Th e EU’s long-term prosperity and sustainability depends on 
innovation, growth and convergence. Th ose countries with a 
serious productivity growth challenge typically have comparatively 
weak institutions and perform less well in education, innovation 
and research. But without more growth in those countries, debt 
dynamics will be unfavourable. Your challenge is to fi nd ways to 
contribute to convergence and growth, while most of the levers to 
do so are at member-state level.
Th e challenge could be compounded by deterioration in the 
economic situation and even the re-emergence of crisis. A recession 
would increase unemployment, which even now after many years of 
recovery, remains a key concern for citizens. Beyond the macroeco-
nomic ups and downs, you could face a sovereign debt crisis in a euro-
area country that would require emergency summits and assistance. 
But you have relatively few instruments under your control to deal 
decisively with such a situation. Th ere is no euro-area budget to use for 
countercyclical fi scal policy and the current negotiations are unlikely 
to lead to a budget of macroeconomic relevance. Th e main truly 
European institution that could respond, the European Central Bank, 
would have to fi nd new tools because of low interest rates and the 
political limits to further bond purchases. Meanwhile, the main euro-
area fi nancial-assistance programmes are in the hands of an inter-gov-
ernmental institution, the European Stability Mechanism, and the 
member states. You must aim to complete the euro area’s governance 
set-up to make it more robust. Th is is all the more important as a badly 
functioning euro area also has long-term social consequences.
*CRISIS RISK
*CAP AND LOST 
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3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Europe’s place in the world
When it comes to strengthening Europe’s position in the world, 
you will have to design and drive a transformative agenda for 
Europe. In trade policy, your task is relatively well-defi ned: you 
need to vigorously defend the multilateral trading system, includ-
ing by fostering its reform, while being ready to retaliate against 
protectionist measures. But to be able to act and respond on a 
more equal footing you need to reduce dependence on China and 
the United States in some key strategic domains while strength-
ening the EU’s own capabilities. Th is will require tackling three 
issues:
Th e EU’s capacity to innovate and remain a technological 
leader: You should strengthen investment in R&D, education and 
improve conditions for innovation and conditions that encour-
age key players in networks to locate in the EU. For example, the 
platform economy is dominated by the American GAFA (Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Amazon), and increasingly by the Chinese 
BATX (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiami). Technological capacity 
infl uences the structure of global networks, which in turn is impor-
tant for the projection of power8. But if the EU cannot trust the 
US to not turn its network hegemony against it, it needs to revisit 
its strategy and aim to attract key network nodes and hubs and to 
create institutional capacity to deal with those hubs.
Th e EU does not lack large digital platform companies because 
of the EU’s competition policy. It lacks such companies because 
of a fragmented market, including a fragmented market for risk 
To be able to act and respond on a more equal 
footing you need to reduce dependence on 
China and the US in key strategic domains
*TECHNOLOGICAL 
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capital, and because of lack of public infrastructure, meaning that, 
all too often, innovative young companies go to the US to grow. 
You should continue the work that your predecessors started to 
deepen and complete the single market, strengthening the digi-
tal single market in particular, exploiting data-privacy rights and 
developing a European approach to the digital age with the citi-
zens at the centre.
Th e eff ectiveness of the EU’s competition policy is globally 
recognised. Relaxing current policies to encourage the creation of 
large European champions might lead to higher domestic prices, 
greater inequality and rather limited benefi ts in terms of innova-
tion and growth9. By contrast, tough competition typically spurs 
innovation. While we are not in favour of subsidising specifi c large 
fi rms, there might be a case for supporting them when they com-
pete in third countries with subsidised fi rms from other jurisdic-
tions. Ideally, however, this issue should be addressed through 
improvements to, and better implementation of, the WTO rules on 
subsidisation. Th ere might also be a case for revising the defi nition 
of dynamic markets.
Th e EU should have an industrial policy that goes beyond 
the single market strategy. A deeper single market is critical for 
the EU’s economic strength. But a clear view of which sectors 
will drive future innovation is also necessary given the targeted 
Chinese approach (European Commission, 2019). Th e EU needs 
to develop a methodology to identify key sectors of relevance 
and go beyond the current ad-hoc approach to supporting spe-
cifi c industries. In the US, three federal institutions (the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, National Institutes of Health 
and National Science Foundation) play crucial roles in pushing 
forward the frontier of knowledge, and enabling private-sector 
R&D in key areas. Similarly, the EU should use the EU budget more 
than today (roughly €10 billion in 2018) to boost digital hardware 
and software systems, including artifi cial intelligence, which are 
critical for autonomy and even security. 
Th e second area where you need to act to boost the EU’s role 
in the global economy is the euro’s role as a global currency. 
Th e euro is already a global currency but its role is below potential 
*COMPETITION 
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on account of the incomplete economic architecture of Economic 
and Monetary Union. To change that, you will need to make con-
crete progress on EU governance. We will return to this in our third 
set of recommendations.  
Th ird, you need to increase Europe’s capacity to safeguard its 
own security. Th is is not a question of a ‘European army’. Instead it 
is about being able to defend EU territory by collaborating in case 
of aggression and to intervene in cyberwar, intelligence operations 
and small rescue operations. Investments in the range of €100 
billion to €300 billion could be needed if Europe wants to have suf-
fi cient defence capabilities without US involvement (ISIS, 2019). 
Th e EU should remain a peace project, capable of defending itself 
but without any ambition to project force in military adventures in 
third countries10. 
Th is gives rise to important organisational questions that you 
need to answer. How would EU countries support each other in 
case of military aggression? Should the EU create a ‘security coun-
cil’ which includes even some non-EU countries (potentially the 
UK) and is capable of taking military decisions outside of NATO? 
How can the various weapon systems of national armies be made 
compatible? Can the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
process be further advanced and procurement be unifi ed? Can EU 
countries form joint capabilities to counter cyberattacks and what 
capacity does the EU have to deal with targeted fake-news cam-
paigns that undermine our democracies? You will need to exercise 
leadership in these domains but not pursue unrealistic and even 
undesirable goals.
Th e question of defence is important because, unfortunately, 
the EU cannot fully chart its own course in trade, technology and 
investment policies without ensuring its own security. But, as you 
know, this view is not accepted equally by diff erent EU countries 
and several countries will not be ready to question reliance on 
NATO as the main defence cooperation agreement. In our view, 
you will therefore have to accept a certain degree of multi-speed in 
this domain11.   
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Africa policy. Africa is connected to Europe in many ways. As our 
direct neighbour, its economic health and political stability are 
core EU interests. Th is topic cuts across trade, investment, devel-
opment, climate, energy and migration policies. You will need 
to further develop your migration strategy, which is still a great 
concern for many citizens and goes beyond the relationships with 
African countries. Th is strategy cannot be narrowly focused only 
on illegal migration but needs to be comprehensive and cover also 
legal migration and its implications for the internal functioning of 
the single market. 
(2) Climate and the environment
Th e EU is already politically committed to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. But progress is 
limited and certain sectors lag behind in their eff orts to reduce 
their impacts on the climate (in particular the transport sector; see 
Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2018). Coal phase out is too slow in 
several countries. 
Putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors is 
indispensable to reduce emissions. You will need to ensure that 
the EU carbon price becomes high enough to lead to more rapid 
and signifi cant changes in behaviour. Other sectors not currently 
participating in the EU emissions trading system will also need 
to be covered, possibly with a tax. Industrial policy can support 
decarbonisation and you should mobilise the EU’s instruments in 
that regard. Regulation on sustainable fi nance is a further lever the 
EU has to manage climate risks. 
Citizens want you to address the climate 
challenge but will dislike the social 
consequences. The transformation also 
offers opportunities for business
*CARBON PRICE
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Your climate strategy will need to address distributional con-
cerns or risk failing politically (Zachmann et al, 2019). To this 
end, the carbon tax proceeds could be redistributed to reduce the 
burden on low-income households12. 
Don’t underestimate how transformative serious climate action 
will be for the entire economic system. Th e rising carbon price and 
the carbon tax should be accompanied by public funding for inno-
vation to accelerate the emergence of new technologies, which 
will create new activities and also cut the cost of clean energy. It 
is crucial to understand the importance of digitalisation for the 
green revolution and support it with public policy. Lowering the 
cost of clean energy is all the more important because key indus-
tries depend on access to aff ordable energy and you need them to 
support the transformation.
Th e EU’s climate strategy also needs to have a global perspec-
tive. Global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise quite 
dramatically, in particular driven by emerging economies. We 
consider three policies as central. First, the EU should continue 
and redouble its eff orts to support emerging economies in basing 
their economic models on green growth. Financial and technolog-
ical support for green infrastructure is good climate policy13 and 
it can also create economic opportunities for leading green EU 
companies. Second, the EU, like other industrialised economies, 
has managed to reduce emissions in production, but not as much 
in consumption of greenhouse gases. Some form of carbon border 
adjustment will be necessary to tackle this14. 
Finally, given that global emissions continue to grow so rap-
idly, scientists increasingly talk of the Anthropocene – a geological 
period in which human activity is the dominant force shaping the 
Earth’s ecosystem. Given that the earth’s climate might be increas-
ingly infl uenced by self-reinforcing feedback loops, we consider it 
essential to study how to manage the fallout from global warming 
and how to reduce emissions by other means15. You should exer-
cise global leadership on this.
(3) Growth and convergence
You should support the improvement of the quality of institutions, 
*FAIR 
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which varies signifi cantly in diff erent EU countries. Governance 
structures and institutional quality are known to go hand-in-hand 
with good and sustainable economic outcomes (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu et al, 2005)16. Even though improving 
institutional quality is, above all, a job for national politics, you 
could and should support such endeavours more than currently. 
You should use the EU budget as a tool to support institutional 
reform programmes and review the EU’s approach to promoting 
good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2019).
One of the fi rst challenges you will face when taking offi  ce is 
to complete the negotiations on the multiannual fi nancial frame-
work. In our view, you should aim to signifi cantly reduce the share 
of spending that goes to the common agricultural policy, while 
boosting spending on innovation and research. Th e EU budget 
should fi nance projects with true European added value, such as 
the European space programme and European infrastructure and 
innovation policy. Structural funds are probably your main instru-
ment to boost growth in the parts of Europe that have a productiv-
ity problem, but their eff ectiveness needs to be increased (Darvas 
et al, 2019). Meanwhile, the common agricultural policy should 
be changed so it focuses on increasing the sustainability of our 
food production17, increasing biodiversity18 and ensuring the best 
results in terms of farmers’ incomes (Ciaian et al, 2015). In short, 
it should be a basic goal to use the budget better and create space 
for spending on new priorities such as migration policy and border 
protection.
You should devote signifi cant political capital to combatting 
tax evasion and fraud and support a fairer distribution of the tax 
burden. Social and tax policies are national policies, but the single 
market makes it easier for large companies and rich individuals 
to reduce their eff ective taxation. An increasing tax burden on 
the working middle class is incompatible with the promises of 
Europe’s social market economy. Th e EU growth strategy should 
also build on useful EU instruments such as the European Social 
Fund and the European Pillar of Social Rights.
You should also contribute to a better management of macro-
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support the relevant authorities in responding rapidly. With inter-
est rates at the zero lower-bound, monetary policy will have little 
to contribute to stem the next downturn. Your role as Commission 
President, together with your responsible Commissioners, will be 
to raise awareness about the importance of national fi scal poli-
cies to stabilise the EU economy. You will have to identify risks 
to the macroeconomy early on and organise a coordinated fi scal 
response. 
On the fi scal rules, we believe that rigid application might lead 
to faulty recommendations. But at the same time, a politically 
partisan interpretation of rules would undermine your institution 
as an independent and neutral broker of compromises. In our 
view, you should therefore not only propose changes to the fi scal 
rules to increase their usefulness for fi scal macro-management. 
You should also clearly explain what you think should be the right 
fi scal policy in any given circumstance – thereby increasing politi-
cal buy-in. A reform of the European Semester with more convinc-
ing communication than currently is much needed. 
In this respect sovereign spreads, while useful in enforcing fi scal 
discipline, can also hamper the ability of some countries to use 
fi scal policy when they need it most and hamper the transmission 
of monetary policy. Your role will be to communicate wisely and 
broker compromises among key players. You should support the 
European Central Bank’s outright monetary transactions pro-
gramme and the European Stability Mechanism as a crucial insti-
tution for the stability of the euro area.
Rigid application of the fi scal rules might 
lead to faulty recommendations, but 
politically partisan interpretations would 
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Last it is clear that you should continue to strengthen the archi-
tecture of the euro area in order to improve its capacity to deliver 
better performance in terms of growth and cohesion. Failing to do so 
risks leaving the system more fragile than it should be. To this end, 
aim to complete banking union. Reducing the exposure of banks to 
national sovereign debt is necessary for your attempt to Europeanise 
the banking system and introduce a European deposit insurance 
scheme (EDIS; see Wolff , 2016). Th e problem you face is that the EU 
has debated this strategy for the last fi ve years without much action. 
Resistance comes from a fear that EDIS would be a transfer to weaker 
countries while resistance to sovereign bond limits remains high 
because of a fear that funding might become more diffi  cult or even 
impossible for the fi scally weaker countries. Th e result is that the 
unstable status quo has prevailed. You will have to look for innova-
tive ideas to break that deadlock19. It is diffi  cult if not impossible to 
implement banking union without at least some additional instru-
ments to support governments’ fi scal policies. You should also look 
for innovative ways to create deep and integrated capital markets, as 
current legislative proposals have not been enough20. How can you 
best secure the support of ministers in promoting this project further? 
Finally, do not abandon the idea of creating a safe asset; instead weigh 
carefully how to do it in a way that does not distribute risk unfairly and 
counterproductively and prepare a template that could be used in the 
next crisis.
4. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In order to deliver an ambitious strategy, you will need to tackle 
three important institutional issues:
• Th e governance of the EU and Europe more generally;
• Th e role of the Commission and its relationship with the 
European Council and the European Parliament;
• Th e internal organisation of the Commission. 
As far as EU governance is concerned, the fi rst issue to consider is 
what to make of the motto “unity in diversity”. Th e EU is a unique 
construction based on a diverse set of countries with a relatively 
low degree of centralisation of decision making. Th is diversity and 
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decentralisation sets us apart from the United States and China. 
Th e coming years will be decisive on whether the EU can preserve 
and succeed with this unique model.
At the 9 May 2019 summit in Sibiu, European leaders reaffi  rmed 
their “belief that united, we are stronger in this increasingly unset-
tled and challenging world”21. Th e method of sustaining unity has 
been eff ective in maintaining sanctions against Russia and also 
keeping a united front in the Brexit negotiations. 
Th e challenge is to reconcile the pledge of unity with the reality 
of diversity. Th e diff erences between the 27 (or 28, should the UK 
decide to remain in the EU) member states make it sometimes 
diffi  cult, or even impossible to make progress in some areas. Unity 
can come at the expense of speed and depth. Unanimity can also 
lead to a lack of experimentation and fl exibility. 
Th ere are two ways to deal with this issue:
• First, one can move to majority decision making at the level of 
27 or 28. Th is should be possible if the union increasingly thinks 
that in the long-term, the pros outweigh the cons. However, the 
option of moving to qualifi ed majority voting on foreign-policy 
decisions has already been rejected several times.
• Second, one could advance in smaller groups on specifi c 
issues. Th e EU treaties allow for smaller groups of countries 
to advance more speedily with specifi c projects. We consider 
it important not to exclude some type of diff erentiation. Any 
move to advance in certain groupings should be based on the 
core European institutional structure: the Commission and the 
European Parliament. It should always be clear that groups of 
EU countries are open to others that wish to join. Within groups, 
it is again possible to see unanimous decision making or major-
ity decision making.
While we prefer greater use of majority voting at EU level, we 
believe you should not exclude advancing in smaller groups on 
some key issues where no unanimity is possible. In taxation for 
example, by moving forward in a smaller group, you would also 
increase the pressure for all to advance. Diff erentiation might be 
the only politically feasible way to deepen integration on some of 
these contentious topics.
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Th e question of multispeed advancement also concerns 
non-EU countries. Th e UK and the EU’s neighbourhood are of par-
amount importance for the EU’s position in the world. Without a 
stable neighbourhood, the EU’s infl uence in the world will decline. 
And the UK is and should remain an important ally in global 
forums such as the G7 or the United Nations. Your predecessors 
have been busy managing Brexit, but to date, no Brexit deal has 
been ratifi ed. One of your main challenges will be to defi ne the 
relationship with the UK and the EU neighbours more broadly, 
including with Turkey and the Western Balkans. Th is indicates a 
need to refl ect on how to arrange multiple levels of integration and 
cooperation in a way that does not create unnecessary political 
tensions. You should not shy away from exploring new models of 
cooperation or limit yourself only to existing models.
Th e second issue is the relationship between your three institu-
tions. Given the increased participation rate in the 2019 European 
elections, we believe that the European Parliament’s role in decid-
ing on key strategic issues will and should increase22. At the same 
time, the European Council also sets out the main strategic guide-
lines for the EU’s future. All three of you will have to work together 
to advance this strategic agenda.      
One of the priority issues in the relationship between the three 
institutions will be the interpretation of the political nature of the 
European Commission. One of the most important institutional 
changes of the last Commission was the explicit political interpretation 
of the mandate of Commission president. Th is approach has yielded 
results. For example, Jean-Claude Juncker prioritised ending austerity 
and interpreted the fi scal rules fl exibly, which we consider to be one 
reason for the improving economic situation of the last few years. Th e 
Commission President has also exercised political leadership in the 
context of the Greek crisis and has been a strong political voice in the 
EU-US relationship. Jean-Claude Juncker also exercised leadership 
and rejected some possible nominations from member states for the 
Commission College. But this approach has also led to accusations 
that the interpretation of fi scal rules was not only done ‘fl exibly’ but 
also in a partisan way – reducing trust in the Commission among some 
countries as a neutral arbiter.
*THE 'POLITICAL' 
COMMISSION
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What does a ‘political’ Commission mean? Th e Commission is 
obviously a political body, since many of the thousands of decisions it 
takes, as guardian of the treaties or initiator of legislation, are based on 
political value judgements. In our view, the Commission should strive 
to interpret its role of guardian of the treaties, ie when it has to interpret 
the treaty and the rules, in an even-handed and non-partisan way. Th e 
EU should not interpret the rules more strictly for countries that are 
run by a government from a diff erent political party, nor should coun-
tries be treated diff erently for reasons unrelated to the issue at hand. 
Otherwise, the Commission would no longer be credible as a neutral 
institution at the service of the union.
Conversely, this also means that the Commission should 
devote suffi  cient resources and tools to monitoring and enforce-
ment of the application of the treaty and rules by member states. 
Th e EU needs to strongly uphold the core principles of the union: 
the rule of law and the defence of core EU values.
Finally, as the nominated Commission President, you should 
fully use your powers to reject the nomination of candidate 
commissioners who do not support key European values. Those 
candidates would also be rejected by the European Parliament 
and the Commission President has a duty to anticipate that and 
to ensure a strong college.  
When it comes to proposing or updating legislation, we 
consider a party-political interpretation of the role of the 
Commission as legitimate. 
Once the Commission takes office, one of your first tasks as 
Commission President, will be to organise the College. Here, 
much will depend on your managerial approach. You might 
prefer a more hierarchical structure with vice presidents or a 
more network-like structure. We consider it fundamental that 
you ensure the strong collaboration of commissioners respon-
sible for a number of related areas – which could be done in 
clusters or hierarchies. The key areas where we see the need for 
close collaboration are:
• European economic sovereignty
• Sustainability
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competition policy
• Migration, asylum, border protection, Schengen, internal 
security
An important prerogative of the Commission President is 
to defi ne the mandate of the commissioners. Th e outgoing 
Commission president gave more detailed work programmes to 
his commissioners than any of his predecessors. We think this is 
a useful way of leading the Commission and is also a good way to 
construct a coherent programme in line with the priorities of the 
various parties that support you in the European Parliament.
Europe faces major challenges, it needs an ambitious agenda 
and the three of you need to work together and with leaders in 
Europe and the world to deliver on this ambitious agenda.
MEMO TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COUNCIL AND PARLIAMENT22 | 
ENDNOTES
 1 For example, by releasing methane currently stored in permafrost. Methane is a 
more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Scientists debate how strong the 
release of methane currently is; see for example Saunois et al (2016). Knoblauch et al 
(2018) points to the relevance of thawing permafrost for methane release. 
 2 See Voosen (2019) for a recent summary pointing out the more signifi cant increase in 
global temperature.  
 3 For detailed reports, see United Nations (2019) and Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2018). 
 4 And despite a rising share of national income going to capital income, the tax 
revenue from taxing capital income seems to be a rather stable percentage of overall 
revenue. 
 5 See Brys et al (2016) for proposals. 
 6 Citizens in southern European countries, however, tend to trust the EU more than 
their national authorities. In northern Europe, national authorities tend to be trusted 
more than the EU. See Eurobarometer data as reported in Demertzis et al (2019). 
 7 Survey conducted for Friends of Europe think tank (2019). Stopping climate change, 
ensuring citizen rights, managing migration, securing peace, fi ghting terrorism and 
taming globalisation are mentioned among the top issues that citizens want the EU 
to deliver on; see De Vries and Hoff mann (2019). Compared to the early 1990s, when 
Europeans were split 50-50 on the issue of defence, the share of people who think 
defence should become an area of joint decision-making was more than 70 percent 
in 2018 (Eurobarometer). 
 8 Th e EU has relied on the US lead when it comes to, for example, intelligence 
gathering. 
 9 Th ere is a separate discussion about the screening of foreign direct investment 
to protect strategic sectors and key public infrastructure. While these measures 
reduce competition and the free fl ow of capital, they are warranted if there are clear 
geostrategic concerns.   
 10 We consider it unlikely and undesirable that the EU will form a political union that 
could legitimise and decide on such actions. Here we disagree with, for example, 
Bildt (2019).  
 11 For example, we could imagine France, Germany and the Benelux increasing 
collaboration or perhaps even creating a European intelligence agency. Th at would 
be an important step towards reducing dependence on US intelligence. 
 12 Simple models for such a scheme have been designed, see for example the carbon 
dividend plan from the Climate Leadership Council (2017). 
 13 See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/fi nance_en for a summary 
of the EU’s international climate fi nance commitments. Many emerging economies 
have made their support for the Paris Agreement conditional on fi nancial support. 
See also Wolff  and Zachmann (2015) 
 14 See Horn and Sapir (2013) for an early discussion on some key ideas how to do so. 
 15 Research is needed on how to increase carbon sequestration through natural means, 
other carbon capture technologies and on what geoengineering would imply.  
 16 Demertzis and Gonzalves Raposo (2018) provided a summary of six World Bank 
governance indicators for all EU countries since 1996 and argued that the EU needs 
to increase its monitoring of institutional quality. 
 17 Diff erent initiatives exist that propose better ways forward. See for example 
International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (2019).  
 18 See, for example, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2019).  
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 19 You might want to consider introducing a European-level deposit insurance 
scheme with lower coverage as a base, to be supplemented by the current national 
schemes. Th e lower European level would still cover the vast majority of deposits 
and would send a strong signal to EU consumers, without being seen as a scheme for 
redistribution.  
 20 In Demertzis et al (2019), we proposed looking into a 28th regime post-Brexit for 
segments of the capital markets, and the use of digital technologies to integrate 
capital markets. 
 21 To this eff ect, they made a number of commitments, including that “We will defend 
one Europe - from East to West, from North to South…Th ere is no place for divisions 
that work against our collective interest” (European Council, 2019). 
 22 Currently, much of the legislative impetus comes from the European Council, which 
asks the Commission to make proposals to the two co-legislators, the Council and the 
Parliament. Several Spitzenkandidaten have proposed that the European Parliament 
should also be able to ask the Commission to make legislative proposals. We support 
this idea, but with two caveats. First, all legislative proposals made by the European 
Commission, regardless of their origin (the Commission itself, the European 
Council, or the Parliament), should be in line with an overall work programme of 
the Commission. Second, requests by the European Parliament should be in areas in 
which the parliament is a co-legislator, and should have the support of a majority of 
its members. 
MEMO TO THE PRESIDENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COUNCIL AND PARLIAMENT24 | 
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty, Crown Business
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2005) ‘Institutions as the fundamental 
cause of long-term growth’, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds) Handbook of Economic 
Growth, Volume 1A, Elsevier
Bildt, C. (2019) ‘Europe’s Only Decision’, Project Syndicate
Brys, B., S. Perrett, A. Th omas and P. O’Reilly (2016) ‘Tax Design for Inclusive 
Economic Growth’, OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 26
Ciaian, P., K. d’Artis and S. Gomez y Paloma (2015) ‘Distributional Eff ects of CAP 
Subsidies: Micro Evidence from the EU’, Outlook on Agriculture 44(1): 19-28
 Climate Leadership Council (2017) Th e Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends. 
Retrieved from https://www.clcouncil.org/our-plan/.
De Vries, C. E. and I. Hoff mann (2019) Th e Hopeful, the Fearful and the Furious, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Darvas, Z., A.M. Collin, J. Mazza and C. Midoes (2019) ‘Eff ectiveness of cohe-
sion policy: Learning from the project characteristics that produce the best results’, 
European Parliament research report, forthcoming 
Demertzis, M. and I. Goncalves Raposo (2018) ‘Structural reforms 0.0 – the case 
for strengthening institutions’, Bruegel Blog, 3 May
Demertzis, M., A. Sapir and G.B. Wolff  (2019) ‘Promoting sustainable and inclusive 
growth and convergence in the European Union’, Policy Contribution 7/2019, Bruegel
Eurobarometer (2018) Delivering on Europe: Citizens‘ Views on Current and Future 
EU Action, Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 of the European Parliament, available at https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/fi les/be-heard/eurobarometer/2018/deliver-
ing_on_europe_citizens_views_on_current_and_future_eu_action/report.pdf
European Commission (2019) China – Challenges and Prospects 
from an Industrial and Innovation Powerhouse, Publications 
Offi  ce of the European Union, available at https://ec.europa.eu/
jrc/en/publication/eur-scientifi c-and-technical-research-reports/
china-challenges-and-prospects-industrial-and-innovation-powerhouse
Farrell, H. and A. Newman (2019) ‘Weaponized Interdependence’, International 
Security, forthcoming
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2019) Th e State of 
the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture, FAO Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture Assessments, available al http://www.fao.org/
state-of-biodiversity-for-food-agriculture/en/
Friends of Europe (2019) Vision for Europe, available at https://www.friendso-
feurope.org/publication/what-should-be-policy-toolbox-new-eu-mandate
Horn, H. and A. Sapir (2013) ‘Can borde r carbon taxes fi t into the global trade 
regime?’ Policy Brief 2013/06, Bruegel
IPCC (2018) Global warming of 1.5°C, Summary for Policymakers, 
 MARIA DEMERTZIS, ANDRÉ SAPIR AND GUNTRAM B. WOLFF25 | 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, available at https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/
pdf/sr15_spm_fi nal.pdf
ISIS (2019) Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for 
NATO’s European Members, International Institute for Strategic Studies, available at 
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-europe
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (2018) The Regional Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services for Europe and Central Asia, available at https://www.ipbes.net/system/
tdf/2018_eca_full_report_book_v5_pages_0.pdf?fi le=1&type=node&id=29180 
International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (2019) Towards a 
Common Food Policy for the European Union, available at http://www.ipes-food.org/
pages/CommonFoodPolicy
Knoblauch, C., C. Beer, S. Liebner, M.N. Grigoriev and E.M. Pfeiffer (2018) 
‘Methane Production as Key to the Greenhouse Gas Budget of Thawing Permafrost’, 
Nature Climate Change 8: 309-312
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2019) Europe’s Burden: Promoting Good Governance across 
Borders, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming
Pe’er, G., L.V. Dicks, P. Visconti, R. Arlettaz, A. Báldi, T.G. Benton … A.V. Scott 
(2014) ‘E U agricultural reform fails on biodiversity’, Science 344(6188): 1090-1092
Saunois, M., P. Bousquet, B. Poulter, A. Peregon, P. Ciais, J.G. Canadell … Q. 
Zhu (2016) ‘The Global Methane Budget 2000-2012’, Earth System Science Data 8 
(2): 697-751
Tagliapietra, S. and G. Zachmann (2018) ‘Addressing Europe‘s failure to clean up 
the transport sector’, Policy Brief 2/2018, Bruegel
Voosen, P. (2019) ‘New Climate Models Predict a Warming Surge’, Science, 16 
April
United Nations (2019) ‘UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline 
“Unprecedented”; Species Extinction Rates “Accelerating”’, press release, 6 
May, available at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/
nature-decline-unprecedented-report/
Wolff, G. (2016) ‘The European Deposit Insurance Scheme’, Bruegel Blog, 23 
May, available at http://bruegel.org/2016/05/the-european-deposit-insurance-scheme/ 
Wolff, G. and G. Zachmann (2015) ‘European Climate Finance: securing the best 
return’, Policy Brief 2015/03, Bruegel
Zachmann, G., G. Frederiksson and G. Claeys (2018) The distributional effects of 
climate policies, Blueprint 28, Bruegel
